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Many observers have expressed concerns about the impact of a rise in interest rates
upon banks in India. In this paper, we measure the interest rate risk of a sample of
major banks in India, using two methodologies. The ﬁrst consists of estimating the
impact upon equity capital of certain interest rate shocks. The second consists of
measuring the elasticity of bank stock prices to ﬂuctuations in interest rates.
We ﬁnd that as of 31 March 2002, many major banks had economically signiﬁcant
exposures. Using the ﬁrst approach, we ﬁnd that roughly two-thirds of the banks in
the sample stood to gain or lose over 25% of equity capital in the event of a 320 bps
move in interest rates. Using the second approach, we ﬁnd that the stock prices of
roughly one-third of the banks in the sample had signiﬁcant sensitivities.
∗We are grateful to cmie and nse for access to the data used in this paper. The views in this paper are
those of the authors and not their respective employers. We beneﬁted from discussions with Y. V. Reddy,
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3Executive summary
From September 2000 to December 2002, the ten-year interest rate on government bonds
fell by 500 basis points, from 11 percent to 6 percent. Many banks proﬁted handsomely
from this drop in interest rates. Since interest rates cannot continue to drop indeﬁnitely,
there is much interest in the question: What would happen to the balance sheets of banks 5
if interest rates go up? Is the banking system adequately prepared for a scenario with
higher interest rates?
The traditional focus in banking supervision in India has been on credit risk. In the Indian
experience, bank fragility and bank failure has (in the past) been primarily caused by bad
loans. The Basle Accord oﬀers thumb rules through which equity capital requirements are 10
speciﬁed, based on the credit risk adopted by banks. This has led to a focus, in banking
policy, upon NPAs, rules for asset classiﬁcation and provisioning.
In addition, changes in interest rates can also have major consequences for banks. When
interest rates go up, every portfolio of bonds or loans suﬀers losses. A bond that has a
duration of 10 years suﬀers a loss of roughly 10% when the long rate (which we consider to 15
be the 10 year rate) goes up by 100 basis points. Banks as a whole have assets of roughly
Rs.10 trillion. Even if the duration of the aggregate asset portfolio of banks was 3 years,
a 100 bps rise in interest rates would give an enormous loss of Rs.30,000 crore.1
However, banks are able to lay oﬀ a substantial fraction of this interest rate risk to their
liabilities. In the case of time deposits, banks directly have long dated liabilities. Current 20
accounts and savings accounts can withdraw at a moments notice.2 However, in practice it
has been found that a signiﬁcant fraction of current accounts and savings accounts tend to
be stable, and can be treated as long dated liabilities. To the extent that demand deposits
are stable, it enables banks to buy long dated assets, without bearing interest rate risk.
Interest rate risk measurement in banking can be done by simulating a scenario of higher 25
interest rates, and putting together the losses on the assets side with gains on the liabilities.
This approach focuses upon the NPV of assets and the NPV of liabilities, and the impact
upon these of a shock to interest rates. To the extent that the change in NPV of assets
and liabilities oﬀset each other, the bank is hedged. If the change in NPV of assets and
liabilities diﬀers, this diﬀerence has to be absorbed by equity capital. 30
In this paper, we approach the measurement of the interest rate risk exposure of banks
through two methods. The ﬁrst method is based on accounting data that is released at an
annual frequency by banks. We go through two steps. We make estimates of cashﬂows at
all maturities for both assets and liabilities. We go on to compute the NPV impact of a
rise in interest rates. 35
1A crore is 10 million.
2In India, current accounts are interest-free demand deposits. Savings accounts are checking accounts,
which ﬁrms are prohibited from holding. The interest rate on savings accounts is set by the central bank,
and is currently 3.5 percent.
4Under existing regulations, banks are not required to disclose cashﬂows at all maturities for
assets and liabilities. We resort to a detailed process of imputation of these cashﬂows using
public domain information. The key diﬃculty in this imputation concerns the behavioural
assumptions that are required about the stability of demand deposits. In an appendix, we
engage in sensitivity analysis focusing on this issue. We create a ‘baseline’ set of plausible 40
assumptions, and perturb it to create two additional ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ sets
of assumptions. We also make calculations for an ‘RBI’ set of assumptions, which uses
existing RBI guidelines governing the treatment of demand deposits.
Once vectors of cashﬂows for both assets and liabilities are known, what is the scenario
of higher interest rates that should be simulated? A proposal from the BIS oﬀers a way 45
in which we can look at past data on interest rate movements, and identify scenarios that
should be evaluated. With Indian data, this works out to a 320 bps increase in the long
rate over a one year horizon. Hence, we focus on analysing the impact of a scenario where
the long rate rose by 320 bps.
We apply these methods to a sample of 42 major banks in India on 31 March 2002. We 50
ﬁnd that the two largest banks, SBI and ICICI Bank, carried relatively little interest rate
risk. However, only 9 of the 42 banks were hedged, in the sense of standing to gain or
lose less than 20% of equity capital in the event of a 320 bps shock. There were seven
banks in the sample which have ‘reverse’ exposures, in the sense that they stood to gain
between 21% and 59% of equity capital in this event. There were 25 banks which stood 55
to lose between 25% and 105% of their equity capital. In the event, interest rates went
down between 31/3/2002 and 31/12/2002, so these 25 banks proﬁted from their exposure
mismatch.
An alternative mechanism for judging the interest rate risk of banks consists of measuring
the interest rate sensitivity of the stock price. Speculators on the stock market have 60
good incentives to monitor banks, assess exposures, and move stock prices in response to
ﬂuctuations in interest rates. At the same time, there are concerns about stock market
liquidity, and the extent to which stock market speculators are given adequate sound
information in terms of disclosures.
We ﬁnd that in a sample of 29 listed banks, roughly one-third seemed to have statistically 65
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in an ‘augmented market model’, which measures the elasticity of
the stock price to movements in the long rate, after controlling for ﬂuctuations of the stock
market index. In the case of banks with highly liquid shares, such as SBI, ICICI Bank and
HDFC Bank, the results obtained from this approach appear to broadly agree with those
obtained using accounting data. 70
In summary, our results suggest that many important banks in the Indian banking system
carried signiﬁcant interest rate risk, as of 31 March 2002, in the sense of having an exposure
of over 25% of their equity capital in the event of a 320 bps shock to the yield curve. We
ﬁnd that there was strong heterogeneity across banks in their interest rate risk exposure.
We ﬁnd that the stock market did seem to exhibit signiﬁcant interest rate sensitivity in 75
5valuing bank stocks.
In India, interest rates were decontrolled as recently as 1993. Bank employees, boards
of directors, and supervisors hence have relatively little experience with measuring and
monitoring interest rate risk. Our results suggest that in addition to credit risk, interest
rate risk is also economically signiﬁcant. 80
These results emphasise that a casual perusal of ‘gap’ statements is an unsatisfactory
approach to measuring interest rate risk. There is a need for banks and their supervisors
to reduce the gap statement into a single scalar: the rupee impact of a given shock to the
yield curve.
RBI has asked banks to create an ‘investment ﬂuctuation reserve’ (IFR), expressed as a 85
fraction of the investment portfolio held by each bank. This approach is unsatisfactory in
only focusing on a subset of the assets of banks. Requirements for equity capital should
reﬂect the vulnerability that banks face, taking into account the interest rate exposure of
all assets and liabilities. Our results also suggest that banks have a strong heterogeneity in
their interest rate risk, so that rules which require equity capital covering a ﬁxed proportion 90
of the investment portfolio would penalise banks that are hedged, and fail to cover the full
risk of some banks which are not.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the backdrop of
interest rate risk in Indian banking. Section 2 describes the two methodologies that are
used in this paper, and the data resources employed. Section 3 shows results from both the 95
methodologies. Section 4 highlights some major policy implications of this work. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
6Figure 1 The 10-year spot rate








The major focus of prudential regulation, and of concerns about systemic fragility in bank-
ing, has traditionally been upon credit risk. Most countries of the world have experienced 100
signiﬁcant bank failures owing to non-performing loans of banks.
Looking beyond credit risk, interest-rate risk is also an important source of vulnerability
for banks. The assets and liabilities of a bank are aﬀected by changes in interest rates. In
general, the impact of a given interest rate change on the assets and liabilities need not be
equal. This would generate an impact upon equity capital, which has to absorb proﬁts or 105
losses (if any).
In India, from 1993 onwards, administrative restrictions upon interest rates have been
steadily eased. This has given a unprecedented regime of enhanced interest rate volatility,
depicted in Figure 1. Hence, banks and supervisors in India now have a new need for
measuring and controlling interest rate risk in banks. In particular, interest rates have 110
fallen sharply in the last four years. If interest rates go up in the future, it would hurt
banks who have funded long-maturity assets using short-maturity liabilities.
By international standards, banks in India have a relatively large fraction of assets held in
government bonds. Government bond holdings of banks in India stood at 27.2 per cent of
assets as of 31 March 2001. In contrast, government bonds comprised only 4.6 per cent of 115
bank assets in the US and a mere 0.3 per cent of bank assets in uk. In the Euro area the
ratio was a little higher at 6.9 percent.
7The phenomenon of large government bond holdings by banks is partly driven by the
large reserve requirements which prevail in India today. However, many banks, who have
been facing diﬃculties in creating sound processes for handling credit portfolios, have 120
been voluntarily holding government securities in excess of reserve requirements. This has
consequences for the interest risk of banks, since the bulk of corporate credit tends to be
in the form of ﬂoating-rate loans (which are hence eﬀectively of a low duration), while the
bulk of government bonds are ﬁxed-rate products (which can have a higher duration than
the typical credit portfolio). 125
For the commercial banking system as a whole in India, short-term time deposits and
demand deposits constitute about 50 per cent of total deposits. Consider a typical bank,
which has government bonds making up 30 percent of assets. In this case, an increase in
interest rates would often erode its net worth. If interest rates went up, the value of the
deposits would not change, but the investment portfolio would depreciate. 130
The interest-rate risk associated with large government bond holdings was exacerbated
by a conscious decision on the part of rbi in 1998, to stretch out the yield curve and
increase the duration of the stock of government debt. This is consistent with the goals
of public debt management, where the issuance of long-dated debt reduces rollover risk
for the government. The weighted average maturity of primary issuance of bonds went up 135
from 5.5 years in 1996-97 to 14.3 years in 2001-02.3
In countries with small reserve requirements, policies concerning public debt management
can be crafted without concerns about the banking system. In India, large reserve require-
ments imply that a policy of stretching out the yield curve may innately involve forcing
banks to increase the maturity of their assets. 140
Internationally, banks have smaller government bond holdings, and they also routinely use
interest rate derivatives to hedge away interest rate risk. In India, while rbi guidelines
advise banks to use Forward Rate Agreements and Interest Rate Swaps to hedge interest
rate risks, these markets are quite small. Exchange-traded futures and options on inter-
est rates have yet to come about. Hence, this avenue for risk containment is essentially 145
unavailable to banks.
These arguments suggest that interest rate risk is an important issue for banks and their
supervisors in India. There is a need for sound measurement of exposure, and for an
evaluation of associated policy issues.
rbi has initiated two approaches towards better measurement and management of interest 150
rate risk. There is now a mandatory requirement that assets and liabilities should be
classiﬁed by time-to-repricing, to create the ‘interest rate risk statement’. This statement
is required to be reported to the board of directors of the bank, and to rbi (but not to
the public). In addition, rbi has created a requirement that banks have to build up an
‘investment ﬂuctuation reserve’ (ifr), using proﬁts from the sale of government securities, 155
3Source: Box XI.I page 177, Annual Report 2001-02, Reserve Bank of India.
8in order to better cope with potential losses in the future.
Going beyond these initiatives, in measuring the vulnerability of banks, it is important to
quantify potential losses in rupee terms. Since equity capital has to absorb losses owing to
interest rate risk (if any), the most important focus of measurement should be the fraction
of equity capital that is consumed in coping with shocks in interest rates. 160
In this paper, we seek to measure the interest rate risk exposure of banks, using publicly
disclosed information. If future cashﬂows can be accurately estimated, then the impact
upon the npv of assets and liabilities of certain interest rate shocks can be measured.
In addition, we can also harness the information processing by speculators on the stock
market, who seek to arrive at estimates of the value of equity capital of banks. When 165
interest rates ﬂuctuate, banks who have signiﬁcant interest rate risk exposure should expe-
rience sympathetic ﬂuctuations in their stock price. If information disclosure is adequate,
and if banks stocks have adequate liquidity, then the speculative process should impound
information about interest rate risk into the observed stock prices. This could give us an
alternative mechanism for measuring the interest rate risk exposure of a bank. 170
The questions explored in this paper are pertinent to banks and their supervisors. From
the viewpoint of a bank, measurement of interest rate risk exposure is an important com-
ponent of the risk management process. From the viewpoint of bank supervision, there
are numerous questions about the interest rate exposure of banks that require elucidation.
Are banks homogeneous in their interest rate risk, or are some entities more exposed than 175
others? Can the most vulnerable banks be identiﬁed through quantitative models? Can
better mechanisms for the measurement of interest rate risk impact upon the mechanisms
of governance and regulation of banks?
1.1 Goals of this paper
The questions that this paper seeks to address are : 180
• What are the interest-rate scenarios which should be the focus of banks and their supervi-
sors, in assessing interest-rate risk?
• What is the impact upon equity capital of parallel shifts to the yield curve of this magnitude,
for important banks?
• Are banks in India homogeneous in their interest-rate risk exposure, or is there strong 185
cross-sectional heterogeneity?
• Do speculators on the stock market impound information about the interest-rate exposure
of a bank in forming stock prices?
• Can we corroborate measures of interest-rate risk inferred from the stock market, with
measures obtained from accounting data? 190
9• What are useful diagnostic procedures through which banks and their supervisors can
measure interest-rate exposure?
2 Methodology
In this section, we describe the two methodologies for risk measurement employed in this
paper. 195
2.1 Measurement of interest-rate risk via accounting disclosure
One traditional approach to measurement of the interest-rate risk of a bank is to focus on
the ﬂow of earnings. This would involve measuring the impact upon the net interest income
of a unit change in interest rates. This is sometimes called “the earnings perspective”.
However, changes in these ﬂows tell an incomplete story, insofar as changes in interest 200
rates could have a sharp impact upon the stock of assets and liabilities of the bank, on
a mark-to-market basis. This motivates “the npv perspective”, which seeks to measure
the impact of interest-rate ﬂuctuations upon the net present value of assets, and liabilities,
and ultimately equity capital.
A thorough implementation of this approach would require a comprehensive enumeration 205
of all assets, liabilities and oﬀ-balance-sheet obligations. Each of these would need to be
expressed as a stream of future cashﬂows. Once this is done, an npv can be computed
under the existing yield curve. In addition, scenarios of interest-rate shocks can be applied
to the yield curve, and their impact upon equity capital measured.
In the measurement of interest-rate risk via accounting data, our ﬁrst step is to utilise 210
public-domain disclosures in arriving at estimates of future cashﬂows of the bank on both
assets and liabilities. The full methodology through which this imputation is done is shown
in Appendix A.
Through this, we emerge with estimates of cashﬂows ((a1,t1),(a2,t2),...,(aN,tN)) for the
assets, where cashﬂow ai is received on date ti. Similarly, future cashﬂows on the liabilities 215
side are estimated as ((l1,t1),(l2,t2),...,(lN,tN)). This paper is based on data for 2001-02.
Hence, we have projections of future cashﬂows as of 31 March 2002.
We use estimates of the zero coupon yield curve as of 31 March 2002.4 Let z(t) be the
interest rate as of 31/3/2002, for a cashﬂow t years in the future. This leads us to npvs of
assets and liabilities : 220
4Some eﬀorts in interest-rate risk measurement use the concept of ytm and apply shocks to ytm. This
has many logical inconsistencies, such as the application of a constant interest rate for discounting all
cashﬂows. We seek to estimate the NPV of cashﬂows that have a maturity structure, with interest rates











We then compute these npvs under certain interest-rate scenarios.5 Appendix B applies
the methodology recommended by the bis, through which we ﬁnd that a shock of 320 basis
points merits examination. Hence, in this paper, we work with two cases, a 200 bps shock










(1 + ∆ + z(ti))ti
Here the expression A(∆) denotes the NPV of assets under a parallel shift ∆. The ex- 225
pression A(0) denotes the unshocked NPV of assets. The impact of the interest rate
shock ∆ upon the asset side is A(∆) − A(0). However, some of this risk is passed on by
the bank to depositors. The residual impact on equity capital of the shock ∆ is hence
(A(∆) − A(0)) − (L(∆) − L(0))
In this paper, we only deal with the simplest interest rate shock, that of a parallel shift of 230
the yield curve. In practice, the exposure of banks can be larger or smaller under other
modes of ﬂuctuation of the yield curve. For example, if the yield curve twists anticlockwise,
with a higher rise in the long rate and a smaller rise (or even a drop) in the short rate, then
the exposure of banks which have long assets and short liabilities would be even greater
than those estimated under a parallel shift. Conversely, clockwise twisting of the yield 235
curve would involve smaller losses to a bank with long assets and short liabilities.
One major diﬃculty faced in this process is that of accurately estimating future cashﬂows
using public-domain information. As Appendix A suggest, there are many elements in this
imputation which are unambiguous. There are primarily two areas where there are subtle
issues in imputation – the treatment of savings and current accounts, and the extent to 240
which assets have ﬂoating rates.
5The GOI yield curve is used in discounting all cashﬂows of assets and liabilities. This is, strictly
speaking, incorrect, since the interest rates used in the real world for many elements are not equal to those
faced by the GOI. However, our focus is upon the change in NPV when there is a shocks to the yield
curve. We do not seek to accurately measure A and L and the level of NPV of the bank. The impact of
this imprecision is hence of second-order importance.
112.1.1 Extent to which savings and current deposits are long-dated
The most important issue aﬀecting the imputation of future cashﬂows lies in assumptions
about the extent to which savings and current accounts can be viewed as long-term liabil-
ities. 245
Technically, savings and current deposits are callable, and can ﬂee at short notice. This
suggests that they should be treated as short-dated liabilities. In practice, banks all over
the world have observed that these deposits tend to have longer eﬀective maturities or
repricing periods (Houpt & Embersit 1991). To the extent that these liabilities prove to be
long-dated, banks would be able to buy long-dated assets, and earn the long-short spread, 250
without incurring interest rate exposure.
The baseline assumptions we use in this paper, which are loosely grounded in empirical
experience in India, are as follows. We assume that 15% of savings accounts are volatile,
and the remainder have a maturity of 1-3 years. We assume that 25% of current accounts
are volatile, and the remainder have a maturity of 1-3 years. These baseline assumptions 255
are more optimistic tha rbi’s guidelines for the interest rate risk statement. These assert
that 75% of savings deposits are “stable”, and that these have an eﬀective maturity of 3-6
months. This appears to be an unusually short time horizon, given (a) the strong stability
of savings accounts and (b) the long time till modiﬁcation of the savings bank interest rate
in India. rbi’s requirements suggest that 100% of current accounts should be considered 260
volatile. This appears to be an unusually strong requirement, when compared with the
empirical experience of banks in India.
The extent to which savings and current deposits would move when interest rates changed
is a behavioural assumption, and alternative assumptions could have a signiﬁcant impact
upon our estimates of interest-rate risk.6 Hence, in Appendix D, we engage in sensitivity 265
analysis where these behavioural assumptions are altered, using the largest bank (SBI) as
an illustration.
2.1.2 Extent to which assets are ﬂoating-rate
In the case of investments, which are made up of government bonds and corporate bonds,
we make the assumption that all assets are ﬁxed-rate. Floating rate assets appear to 270
predominate with demand loans, term loans and bills.
We make the following assumptions:
• All demand loans and term loans are plr-linked,
6One facet of this problem is linked to money market mutual funds (mmmfs), a product which competes
with demand deposits. In countries where mmmfs are well established, a signiﬁcant fraction of demand
deposits move to them. India has yet to create a signiﬁcant mmmf industry. Hence, looking forward, the
shock to demand deposits owing to the growth of mmmfs lies in store.
12• 90% of bills are plr-linked.
These assumptions are highlighted here since they are important in understanding and 275
interpreting the results. However, there appears to be a consensus that these are sound
assumptions. Hence, we do not undertake sensitivity analysis which involves varying these
assumptions.
2.1.3 The usefulness of simple models
The approach taken here is sometimes criticised on the grounds that it constitutes a highly 280
oversimpliﬁed model of the true interest rate risk of a bank. At a conceptual level, there
are four major issues which could impact upon this measurement:
• Imputation of future cashﬂows,
• Optionality embedded in assets and liabilities,
• Basis risk, 285
• Interest-rate derivatives.
Our approach is focused on the ﬁrst; we impute future cashﬂows using public domain data,
with some treatment of the optionality embedded in savings and current deposits. In this
paper, we do not deal with other diﬃculties associated with optionality, or with basis risk
and interest-rate derivatives. 290
There are four arguments in favour of our simple approach:
Interest rate derivatives India is a relatively unique country, by world standards, in the neg-
ligible extent to which interest-rate derivatives are used by banks to transform the balance
sheet. Hence, measurement of interest-rate risk of banks while paying no attention to
the oﬀ-balance sheet positions of banks on interest-rate derivatives markets is uniquely 295
pertinent in India.
Optionality Banks in India do carry signiﬁcant risk, in addition to that modelled by us, owing
to prepayment options which are believed to exist for a signiﬁcant fraction of the assets.
In particular, this is a particularly important issue in the treatment of home loans. However,
as of 31 March 2002, home loans were a relatively small fraction of bank assets.7
300
Basis risk In this paper, we assume that all the interest rates, on both assets and liabilities,
move synchronously with parallel shifts in the GOI yield curve. In practice, most rates do
exhibit idiosyncratic variation. This implies that banks carry basis risk, over and above
that measured in this paper.
7However, home loans are experiencing extremely high growth rates in India. In the future, a more
thorough treatment of optionality will become more important in the measurement of interest rate risk of
banks in India.
13In particular, banks carry signiﬁcant basis risk in terms of the lack of adjustment of the 305
savings bank rate to ﬂuctuations in the yield curve, which is inconsistent with the baseline
assumptions, that 85% of savings deposits have a maturity of 1-3 years.
Using detailed information from banks Such an eﬀort could, in principle, be done using
much more detailed information about bank assets and liabilities. Banks do have access to
much more information when compared with the highly limited information set which is 310
placed in the public domain.
Wright & Houpt (1996) describe a comparison of a simple model, similar to that presented
here, against a much more extensive modelling eﬀort at the United States Oﬃce of Thrift
Supervision, where 500 distinct numbers from within each bank were utilised to create a
more complex model. This comparison reveals that the simple model yields values which 315
are fairly close to those obtained using the more complex eﬀort. This helps encourage us
on the usefulness of simple models.
Our work here is also important insofar as it reﬂects the information processing that can
be done by shareholders and depositors of a bank, using public domain information. If
non-public information were utilised here, the results would not reﬂect the expectations of 320
rational external economic agents who make decisions involving a bank.
Our conservative treatment of optionality and basis risk suggests that the estimates of
interest-rate risk shown here contain a downward bias. In reality, banks in India are
likely to have a true vulnerability to interest-rate ﬂuctuations which is larger than these
estimates. 325
2.1.4 Relationship with ‘value at risk’
Value at Risk (VaR) is an attractive framework for risk measurement (Jorion 2000). If the
VaR with respect to interest rate risk of a bank were desired, at a 99% level of signiﬁcance
on a one year horizon, we would need to go through the following steps:
1. Model the data generating process for the zero coupon yield curve, 330
2. Simulate N draws from the yield curve on a date one year away,
3. Reprice assets and liabilities at each of these draws,
4. Compute the 1th percentile of the distribution of proﬁt/loss seen in these N realisations.
This procedure is diﬃcult to implement, primarily because the existing state of knowl-
edge, on the data generating process for the yield curve, is weak. This motivates three 335
simpliﬁcations:
• We focus on parallel shifts of the yield curve as the prime source of risk. This is the
assumption made in existing bis proposals.
This ignores risks that arise from other modes of ﬂuctuation of the yield curve.
14• The bis proposal for interest rate risk measurement suggests that the distribution of one- 340
year changes in the long rate should be utilised to read oﬀ the 1th percentile point.
This is a highly unsatisfactory approach, given the fact that a daily time-series of overlap-
ping one-year changes in the long rate exhibits strong violations of independence.
• We compute the proﬁt/loss consequences of this one interest rate shock.
However, the proﬁt/loss associated with a 1th percentile event on the interest rate pro- 345
cess is not the 1th percentile of the distribution of proﬁt/loss, given the nonlinearities of
transformation in computing npv.
For these reasons, the procedure adopted here, while widely used in industry and consistent
with existing bis proposals, may at best be interpreted as a poor approximation of VaR
at a 99% level of signiﬁcance on a one-year horizon. If VaR is the goal of interest rate risk 350
measurement, the framework used in this paper clearly entails substantial model risk.
The bis proposals advocate the use of an ad-hoc 200 bps shock, in the absence of the data-
driven procedure which yields the magnitude of the shock of interest to the risk manager.
While results for 200 bps are shown in this paper for sake of completeness, this is a purely
ad-hoc number, with little value in interpretation. We focus on the results using the 355
data-driven procedure when it comes to interpretation.
2.2 Measurement of interest-rate risk via stock market informa-
tion
If ﬂuctuations in interest rates have a material impact upon the assets and liabilities of a
bank, then this should be reﬂected in stock prices. A bank which has a lot to lose when 360
interest rates go up should be one where the stock price reacts sharply when interest rates
go up (Robinson 1995, Drakos 2001).
The ‘market model’ is a standard framework for measuring the sensitivity of an individual
stock to ﬂuctuations in the market index. It consists of the time-series regression:
(rj − rf) = α + β1(rM − rf) + 
where rj is the return on a stock, rf is the returns on a short-dated government bond, and 365
rM is the return on the equity market index. This yields estimates for β1, the elasticity of
returns on the stock against returns on the index. It is conventional in the ﬁnance litera-
ture to express returns on both sides of the market model as returns on zero-investment
portfolios (Fama 1976).8 For example, rM −rf is the return on a zero-investment portfolio
which holds the market index, and is ﬁnanced by borrowing at the short rate. 370
8When the market model has returns on zero-investment portfolios on both sides of the equation, as is
the case here, the null hypothesis H0 : α = 0 is a useful speciﬁcation test. This is one reason to favour
15In this paper, we estimate an ‘augmented market model’, of the form:
(rj − rf) = α + β1(rM − rf) + β2(rL − rf) + 
where rL is the return on a long government bond. This diﬀers from the conventional
market model in having one additional explanatory variable, (rL −rf). This regressor can
be interpreted as the return on a portfolio where the long bond is purchased, using funds
borrowed at the short rate. This is particularly appropriate for our goal of measuring the 375
extent to which banks are engaged in this very investment strategy.
When this model is estimated using data over a given period, it gives us an estimate ˆ β2 of
the average interest rate sensitivity over this period. In reality, the interest rate exposure
of a bank can ﬂuctuate from day to day. This regression approach does not capture these
ﬂuctuations. This is in contrast with our work with accounting data, which captures the 380
interest rate risk as of one day, 31 March 2002.
The augmented market model can be estimated using daily or weekly data. In an ideal
eﬃcient market, information that impacts upon interest rates should get absorbed into the
equity price on the very same day. In practice, the non-transparency of India’s government
bond market, and the illiquidity of many bank stocks, could generate slower responses. 385
Hence, there is merit in estimating this model using both daily and weekly data.
Another aspect which needs to be addressed is the time-series structure of the explanatory
variables. In an ideal eﬃcient market, the rM, rL and rf time-series should be free of
serial correlations. In the real world, many market imperfections may exist, particularly in
the case of the government bond market, which suﬀers from non-transparency, barriers to 390
access, regulatory constraints on short selling, etc. In addition, the time-series of the market
index can exhibit spurious autocorrelations owing to non-synchronous trading of index
components (Lo & MacKinlay 1990). Hence, we may ﬁnd signiﬁcant serial correlations in
all the three time-series, i.e. rM, rL and rf.
Stock market returns at time t are likely to respond to the innovations in explanatory 395
variables. This problem can be addressed by estimating arma models for the rf and
rL series, extracting residuals, and using these residuals as explanatory variables in the
augmented market model. Appendix C shows the models through which this is done.
2.3 Data description
As background, Table 1 shows summary statistics about the dataset. The banking system 400
is highly concentrated in these banks, with Rs.10 trillion of deposits placed here, of a total
using (rM − rf) as an explanatory variable on the augmented market model, instead of directly using
interest rates.
16Table 1 Major banks in India
(Rs. crore)
Total Gross Market
Rank Bank Deposits Assets value added Capitalisation
1 State Bank Of India 270560.14 348541.15 30148.63 15220.56
2 I C I C I Bank Ltd. 32085.10 104963.08 2125.24 9045.28
3 Punjab National Bank 64123.48 72980.14 6469.19 2091.91
4 Canara Bank 64030.01 72211.39 6778.85 2662.95
5 Bank Of Baroda 61804.47 70910.07 5924.49 2215.56
6 Bank Of India 59710.60 70059.08 5707.76 2003.18
7 Union Bank Of India 39793.86 44374.96 3911.88 1161.80
8 Indian Overseas Bank 31808.49 35441.13 3214.14 789.52
9 Oriental Bank Of Commerce 28488.40 32262.92 3043.84 1148.50
10 Syndicate Bank 28548.33 31756.18 2758.02 818.87
11 Uco Bank 26848.78 31381.39 2595.20
12 Allahabad Bank 22665.94 24764.47 2222.94 533.92
13 H D F C Bank Ltd. 17653.81 23787.38 1736.12 6708.35
14 Corporation Bank 18924.27 23604.20 2035.15 2089.20
15 State Bank Of Hyderabad 17402.75 22120.80 1955.92
16 Bank Of Maharashtra 19130.64 21470.45 2025.04
17 Andhra Bank 18490.76 20937.24 2067.49 1176.75
18 Dena Bank 15354.68 18434.80 1541.24 292.65
19 State Bank Of Patiala 13947.10 17336.94 1490.11
20 State Bank Of Travancore 13459.68 16493.37 1434.23 232.00
21 Vijaya Bank 14680.51 16144.48 1576.74 585.56
22 State Bank Of Bikaner & Jaipur 11661.00 15552.21 1447.49 265.50
23 Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. 12911.11 14698.66 1456.33 608.43
24 U T I Bank Ltd. 12287.21 14403.76 1314.79 851.65
25 Punjab & Sind Bank 12482.62 13753.57 1229.37
26 I N G Vysya Bank Ltd 8068.28 10777.29 1024.49 596.17
27 State Bank Of Mysore 8524.85 10353.67 1011.62 164.56
28 Indusind Bank Ltd. 8400.12 10242.84 685.62 264.80
29 Federal Bank Ltd. 8865.30 10163.80 1053.48 206.85
30 Karnataka Bank Ltd. 7001.48 7784.48 885.81 191.45
31 Global Trust Bank Ltd. 6443.08 7416.15 690.57 211.77
32 I D B I Bank Ltd. 5234.49 6663.62 525.34 389.35
33 South Indian Bank Ltd. 5919.70 6555.01 672.89 135.50
34 Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. 4180.05 5112.47 531.35 219.30
35 Bank Of Rajasthan Ltd. 3959.98 4820.00 494.79 170.03
36 Centurion Bank Ltd. 3534.99 4059.16 386.16 143.32
37 Bank Of Punjab Ltd. 3353.57 3882.87 376.39 159.07
38 Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. 2476.92 2870.01 303.90
39 City Union Bank Ltd. 1973.71 2230.19 221.40 84.60
40 Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd. 1823.26 2106.94 186.18
41 Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd. 1657.24 1888.60 196.66 60.59
42 Lord Krishna Bank Ltd. 1502.38 1724.88 179.39
Sum of above banks 1011773 1277035 105636 53499
Sum over 153 banks 1222285 1555600 131534 54462
Fraction in our dataset (percent) 82.77 82.09 80.31 98.23
17of Rs.12.2 trillion with the universe of 153 banks observed in the cmie Prowess database.
Our dataset of 42 banks covers around 80% of bank deposits, assets or value added.
2.3.1 Accounting information about banks
For the purpose of monitoring liquidity risk, rbi requires banks to disclose a statement on 405
the maturity pattern of their assets and liabilities classiﬁed in diﬀerent time buckets. This
table is shown in the annual report of each bank. This disclosure commenced from the
accounting year 1999-2000 onwards.
This “liquidity table” reports assets and liabilities of the bank classiﬁed according to when
they are expected to mature. Liabilities consist of deposits and bank borrowing classiﬁed 410
into diﬀerent time buckets. While bank borrowings and time deposits are bucketed ac-
cording to their time remaining to maturity, current and saving deposits that do not have
speciﬁc maturity dates are classiﬁed according to rbi alm guidelines. Assets consist of
loans and advances and investments. Investments in corporate and government debt are
combined into one category and bucketed according to their time to maturity. Similarly, 415
loans are bucketed according to their maturity patterns.9
rbi requires banks to additionally submit an ‘interest rate risk statement’, where assets
are classiﬁed by their time to repricing. However, this statement is not released to the
public.
Apart from the liquidity statement, we utilise some other information from the balance 420
sheet. Table 10 shows an example of the full set of information from public domain ac-
counting disclosure about one bank (sbi) that is utilised by us.
In this paper, ‘equity capital’ is measured as the sum of paid up capital and reserves.
Existing RBI rules do not require banks to do a full marking-to-market of all securities.
As a consequence, many banks had unrealised gains on their GOI bond portfolios as of 31 425
March 2002. To the extent that this is the case, our estimate of their equity capital would
be understated. Our estimates of the rupee impact of a given interest rate move would be
9There appear to be some discrepencies in the audited annual reports released by some banks. There
were 4 banks in our sample where adding up deposits, across time buckets in the maturity statement, does
not tally with deposits measured on the balance sheet.
(Rs. crore)
Deposits
Bank From balance sheet Summing in maturity stmt.
State Bank of Patiala 13947.10 13684.87
State Bank of Mysore 8524.85 8481.34
Uco Bank 26848.77 25224.00
Central Bank of India 47137.38 46380.82
18accurate, but when expressed as a fraction of equity capital, we have an upward bias in
estimates of the interest rate exposure.
2.3.2 The yield curve 430
We follow the speciﬁcation search of Thomas & Pawaskar (2000) which suggests that the
Nelson-Siegel model oﬀers a good approximation of the spot yield curve in India (Thomas
& Shah 2002). In the Nelson-Siegel model (Nelson & Siegel 1987), the yield curve is
approximated by a functional form that involves four free parameters a0,a1,a2,a3:




We use the database of daily yield curves from 1/1/1997 till 31/7/2002 produced at nse 435
using this methodology (Darbha et al. 2002), which gives us parameters (a0,a1,a2,a3) for
each day.
2.3.3 Data for the augmented market model
We use stock market returns data from the cmie Prowess database. We use the Nifty
Total Return index as the market index (Shah & Thomas 1998). 440
In the case of time-series on the short and long government bond, we derive these from the
time-series of the zero coupon yield curve. We deﬁne the short rate as being for 30 days,
and the long rate as being for 10 years. The bond returns series is computed as follows.
Suppose the interest rate, for a zero coupon bond of maturity T, goes up from r1 on day
1 to r2 on day 2. Then the log returns on the bond, where the bond price goes from p1 to 445
p2, can be computed as:
log(p2/p1) = −T (log(1 + r2) − log(1 + r1))
The numerical values obtained with 100log(p2/p1) are closer to percentage changes and
are hence easier to interpet. Hence, we work with the time-series of −100T times the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of log(1 + r).
Through this mechanism, we create time-series of notional bond returns on the 30-day and 450
the 10-year zero coupon bond, priced oﬀ the nse zcyc. This gives us time-series for rL
and rf.





Figure 3 The spread between the long and short interest-rates







Our work with accounting data pertains to the ﬁscal year 2001-02. This is a relatively
short period for estimation of the augmented market model. Hence, for the market model 455
estimation, we use a two–year period, from 1 April 2000 to 31 March 2002.10
There is an innate problem in the span of data used in the augmented market model (see
Figure 2). We use stock market data from 1 April 2000 to 31 March 2002. However,
the accounting information for 2001-02 (which is used in our accounting-based measure-
ment of exposure) is only released much after 2001-02 has ended. Hence, this accounting 460
information is not in the public domain in the time-period over which stock returns are
observed.
In our exploration of the sensitivity of stock market returns to ﬂuctuations in (rL − rf),
the statistical precision with which we measure the coeﬃcient β2 is related to the volatility
10If, in principle, our sole goal was to measure β2, it would be desirable to have a longer span of data.
However, that would conﬂict with our goal of linking up estimates of exposure from the two methodologies.
20Table 2 Banks with ‘reverse’ exposures
This table shows the seven banks in our sample who prove to have a signiﬁcant ‘reverse’ exposure, in the
sense that they stand to earn proﬁts in the event that interest rates go up. The exposures here range from
Global Trust Bank, which would gain 58.9% of equity capital in the event of a +320 bps shock, to Uco
Bank, which would gain 21.1%.
(Percent)
∆E/E ∆E/A
Sr.No. Bank 200 bps 320 bps 200 bps 320 bps
1. Global Trust Bank 39.0 58.9 1.3 1.9
2. State Bank of Patiala 35.0 53.0 2.3 3.5
3. Bank Of Maharashtra 33.3 52.1 1.1 1.7
4. Canara Bank 22.2 34.4 1.1 1.7
5. State Bank of Mysore 17.3 27.4 0.6 0.9
6. Centurion Bank 17.2 27.0 0.7 1.1
7. Uco Bank 13.8 21.1 1.2 1.9
in (rL − rf) which was experienced over this period. Figure 3 shows a time-series of the 465
spread between the short interest-rate (30 days) and the long interest-rate (10 years). We
see that from the viewpoint of statistical eﬃciency, the period of interest was fortunately
one where this spread was highly variable.
3 Results
As an example, Appendix E shows detailed results of applying the two methods to the 470
largest bank of the system, SBI. In this appendix, we also show sensitivity analysis, across
four sets of assumptions for the extent to which savings and current accounts are long
dated.
3.1 Results with accounting data
We show results of simulating shocks to the yield curve for our sample of 42 banks, as of 475
31 March 2002. For each bank, we show ∆E/E, the impact expressed as percent of equity
capital, and ∆E/A, the impact expressed as percent of assets.
We focus on the percentage impact upon equity capital for a 320 bps shock, as the metric
of interest rate risk. This proves to range from +58.9% for Global Trust Bank to -104.7%
for Indian Overseas Bank. 480
Table 2 shows the seven banks who seem to have signiﬁcant ‘reverse’ exposures; i.e. they
would stand to earn signiﬁcant proﬁts if interest rates went up (and conversely). While
21Table 3 Banks which appear to be hedged
This table shows the nine banks in our sample who seem to be fairly hedged w.r.t. interest rate risk. The
exposures here range from pnb, which would gain 6.3% of equity capital in the event of a +320 bps shock,
to icici Bank, which would lose 15.4%.
(Percent)
∆E/E ∆E/A
Sr.No. Bank 200 bps 320 bps 200 bps 320 bps
8. Punjab National Bank 3.5 6.3 0.1 0.3
9. Karur Vysya Bank 2.1 3.3 0.2 0.3
10. HDFC Bank 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0
11. Allahabad Bank -0.7 0.0 -0.0 0.0
12. UTI Bank -0.5 -0.5 -0.0 -0.0
13. Syndicate Bank -0.8 -1.1 -0.3 -0.5
14. Bank Of Rajasthan -7.1 -10.2 -0.3 -0.5
15. State Bank of India -8.5 -11.2 -0.4 -0.5
16. icici Bank -10.3 -15.4 -0.7 -1.0
this appears proﬁtable in the event of a rise in interest rates, it would generate losses in the
event of a rise in interest rates, as has been the case between 31/3/2002 and 31/12/2002.
Table 3 shows the nine banks who appear to be hedged, in the sense of having an exposure 485
in the event of a +320 bps shock which is smaller than 25% of equity capital.
Table 4 shows the 26 banks in the sample who seem to have signiﬁcant interest rate
exposure. These banks could lose 25% or more of their equity capital in the event of a
+320 bps shock. Of these, there are 15 banks which stand to lose more than 50% of equity
capital. 490
In summary, of the 42 banks in this sample, nine lack signiﬁcant interest rate exposure,
while 34 have signiﬁcant exposure. Figure 4 gives a graphical presentation of the size of
banks and their total exposure.
3.2 Results based on stock market data
We obtain estimates using both daily and weekly data for the augmented market model. 495
In both cases, we work via the raw returns, and additionally using arma residuals. This
gives us four sets of estimates for each bank.11
Table 5 shows the coeﬃcient β2 and the t statistic for this coeﬃcient for the four cases.
The table is sorted by the coeﬃcient value with weekly data using the raw (rL −rf) as an
explanatory variable. 500
11In all cases, we ﬁnd that the speciﬁcation test, using the null hypothesis H0 : α = 0 is not rejected.
22Table 4 Banks with signiﬁcant exposure
This table shows the 26 banks in our sample who seem to have signiﬁcant interest rate exposure. The
exposures here range from Laxshmi Vilas Bank, which would lose 24.6% of equity capital in the event of
a +320 bps shock, to Indian Overseas Bank, which would lose 104.7%.
(Percent)
∆E/E ∆E/A
Sr.No. Bank 200 bps 320 bps 200 bps 320 bps
17. Laxshmi Vilas Bank -16.8 -24.6 -1.0 -1.4
18. Union Bank of India -18.1 -26.1 -0.9 -1.2
19. Bharat Overseas Bank -19.9 -29.4 -1.2 -1.7
20. Corporation Bank -20.2 -30.1 -1.8 -2.6
21. Punjab and Sind Bank -22.9 -33.6 -0.7 -1.1
22. Lord Krishna Ltd. -23.6 -34.8 -1.5 -2.2
23. Vyasa Bank -23.9 -35.4 -1.5 -2.2
24. Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd. -25.4 -37.7 -1.6 -2.4
25. Bank of India -26.8 -39.8 -1.1 -1.6
26. Bank of Baroda -27.8 -41.5 -1.5 -2.2
27. Indusind Bank -28.2 -42.8 -1.6 -2.4
28. South Indian Bank Ltd. -34.0 -49.8 -1.4 -2.1
29. S. B. of Bikaner and Jaipur -35.3 -52.6 -1.7 -2.5
30. Andhra Bank -35.6 -52.7 -1.5 -2.2
31. IDBI Bank -35.3 -53.8 -1.6 -2.4
32. Dhanalakshmi Bank -37.9 -56.0 -1.7 -2.5
33. City Union Bank -37.5 -56.3 -2.4 -3.6
34. Oriental Bank of Commerce -38.6 -57.1 -1.9 -2.9
35. Federal Bank -41.6 -61.9 -1.8 -2.7
36. Bank of Punjab -44.5 -66.6 -2.2 -3.3
37. State Bank of Travancore -50.3 -74.7 -1.9 -2.8
38. State Bank of Hyderabad -49.9 -74.9 -2.2 -3.4
39. Karnataka Bank -51.7 -77.1 -2.9 -4.4
40. Vijaya Bank -53.5 -80.1 -2.2 -3.3
41. Dena Bank -64.6 -95.9 -2.0 -3.0
42. Indian Overseas Bank -70.3 -104.7 -2.2 -3.4
23Figure 4 Results based on accounting data
The ﬁgure summarises the exposure of all banks in the sample. The width of each bar is proportional to












































































































































24Table 5 Sensitivity of stock returns to interest-rate movements
This table reports the coeﬃcient on the interest-rate factor in the augmented market model. Estimates
based on both daily and weekly returns are displayed. In each case, we show the coeﬃcient (and the t
statistic) of xL = rL−rf, and of the excess returns computed using innovations, ixL = irL−irf. Coeﬃcients
which are signiﬁcant at a 95% level of signiﬁcance are shown in boldface.
For example, in the case of Vijaya Bank, the coeﬃcients with daily data prove to be -0.053 and 0.107
respectively, with t statistics of -0.17 and 0.36. With weekly data, we get much larger coeﬃcients of 1.355
and 1.330, with t statistics of 2.78 and 2.75. This is consistent with the idea that Vijaya Bank is a relatively
illiquid stock where interest-rate ﬂuctuations may not appear in stock returns on the same day.
The table is sorted by the numerical value of the coeﬃcient seen with xL with weekly data. This ﬁrst
seven banks in the list are thus the most vulnerable, with interest-rate sensitivities which are in the top
quartile amongst listed banks.
Bank Daily Weekly
xL t ixL t xL t ixL t
VIJAYA BANK -0.053 -0.17 0.107 0.36 1.355 2.78 1.330 2.75
U T I BANK LTD. 0.058 0.30 0.035 0.18 1.026 2.21 0.853 1.96
BANK OF BARODA 0.169 0.92 0.360 1.92 1.015 2.37 0.757 1.85
I D B I BANK LTD. -0.028 -0.14 0.012 0.06 0.980 1.89 0.733 1.49
BANK OF INDIA 0.245 1.39 0.356 1.98 0.939 2.32 0.825 2.15
STATE BANK OF INDIA 0.281 2.02 0.333 2.34 0.836 2.32 0.587 1.66
DENA BANK 0.184 0.69 0.233 0.86 0.831 1.72 0.831 1.81
STATE BANK OF MYSORE 0.428 0.73 0.499 0.81 0.805 2.10 0.696 1.92
INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK -0.350 -1.11 -0.318 -1.02 0.741 1.85 0.780 1.97
SOUTH INDIAN BANK LTD. -0.199 -0.62 0.015 0.04 0.632 1.07 0.443 0.79
ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE 0.124 0.99 0.165 1.29 0.616 3.12 0.519 2.69
GLOBAL TRUST BANK LTD. 0.246 0.82 0.254 0.83 0.595 0.85 0.090 0.13
CITY UNION BANK LTD. 0.385 1.16 0.655 1.94 0.503 1.30 0.471 1.29
I C I C I BANK LTD. -0.123 -0.50 0.003 0.01 0.448 0.69 0.273 0.44
SYNDICATE BANK 0.111 0.84 0.105 0.78 0.385 1.26 0.352 1.21
CORPORATION BANK 0.126 0.63 0.238 1.16 0.278 0.61 0.161 0.37
CENTURION BANK LTD. -0.060 -0.25 -0.144 -0.58 0.269 0.53 0.236 0.50
BANK OF RAJASTHAN LTD. -0.063 -0.33 -0.046 -0.23 0.259 0.68 0.196 0.54
FEDERAL BANK LTD. 0.688 2.97 0.644 2.71 0.237 0.46 0.002 0.00
JAMMU and KASHMIR BANK LTD. 0.117 0.67 0.169 0.94 0.208 0.55 0.153 0.42
STATE BANK OF BIKANER and JAIPUR 0.382 2.24 0.416 2.38 0.184 0.69 0.252 0.99
DHANALAKSHMI BANK LTD. 0.476 1.89 0.502 1.95 0.153 0.30 -0.184 -0.38
ANDHRA BANK 0.082 0.40 0.139 0.69 0.113 0.34 0.021 0.06
INDUSIND BANK LTD. -0.043 -0.21 0.013 0.06 0.060 0.14 0.042 0.11
UNITED WESTERN BANK LTD. 0.110 0.51 0.038 0.17 0.012 0.02 -0.074 -0.14
STATE BANK OF TRAVANCORE 0.339 0.93 0.310 0.83 -0.107 -0.27 -0.029 -0.07
BANK OF PUNJAB LTD. -0.106 -0.67 -0.117 -0.72 -0.199 -0.65 -0.039 -0.13
H D F C BANK LTD. -0.049 -0.33 -0.033 -0.22 -0.351 -1.00 -0.418 -1.27
VYSYA BANK LTD. 0.082 0.32 0.013 0.05 -0.402 -0.74 -0.513 -0.99
25In the case of sbi, which is the most liquid bank stock in the country, we see strong
t statistics of 2.02 and 2.34 with daily data. Apart from this, most of the banks show
stronger coeﬃcients with weekly data. This suggests that the stock market is not able to
rapidly absorb information about interest rates in forming bank stock prices.
Roughly speaking, a 320 bps shock would give returns on the long bond of -32%. If we 505
have a β2 of 0.8, then this implies an impact on equity of -25.6%.
For roughly one third of the banks in our sample, the null H0 : β2 = 0 can be rejected
at a 95% level of signiﬁcance, for one or more variants of the augmented market model.
The coeﬃcients seen here are economically signiﬁcant, suggesting signiﬁcant interest-rate
exposure on the part of these banks. 510
3.3 Comparing results obtained from the two approaches
There are some banks where both approaches show similar results. For example, Vijaya
Bank, Dena Bank, OBC and IDBI Bank stand out as banks which have a large exposure
by both approaches. However, there are numerous banks where the two approaches dis-
agree signiﬁcantly. Global Trust Bank and State Bank of Mysore seem to have signiﬁcant 515
‘reverse’ exposures, however their β2 coeﬃcients are positive. UTI Bank is a case where
the accounting data suggests that there is no exposure, however the stock market clearly
disagrees.
There are 29 listed banks for which we have results from both approaches. We cannot
reject the null hypothesis of a zero rank correlation between β2 (from the stock market 520
approach) and the percentage impact upon equity of a 320 bps shock (from the accounting
data approach).
To some extent, this may be explained by innate diﬃculties in comparing these results.
The accounting data tells us something about exposure as of 31 March 2002. The stock
market data tells us about the average exposure over a two year period. Further, the 525
accounting data for 2001-02 is typically released by September 2002. This suggests that
the information that we attribute to 2001-02 only became available to speculators on
the stock market much later. Finally, this lack of connection between results from the two
approaches may suggest a need for improved rules about disclosure under listing agreements
with stock exchanges. 530
One additional feature which has an important impact here is stock market liquidity. If
we focus on the three banks with the most liquid equity, we see that:
SBI By the accounting approach, SBI stands to lose 8.5% of equity capital in the event of a 200
bps rise in the long rate. The market model at weekly frequency has a coeﬃcient of 0.836,
which would imply an drop in the share price of roughly 16.6% in the event of a 200 bps 535
rise.
26ICICI Bank By the accounting approach, ICICI Bank stands to lose 10.3% of equity capital in
the event of a 200 bps rise. The market model implies that there is no signiﬁcant exposure.
HDFC Bank Both approaches agree that there is no signiﬁcant exposure.
This suggests for these liquid stocks, there is some agreement between the results from the 540
two approaches. This may suggest that the market eﬃciency of the stock price process for
many other banks is inhibited by inadequate stock market liquidity.
4 Policy implications
Our results suggest that in addition to credit risk, interest rate risk is also important in
India’s banking system. The potential impact of interest rate shocks, upon equity capital of 545
many important banks in the system, seems to be economically signiﬁcant. These problems
are compounded by public ownership; banks such as Dena Bank and Vijaya Bank have
substantial exposures and are likely to make claims upon the exchequer in the event of
adverse interest rate movements.
Our results emphasise that the casual perusal of ‘gap’ statements is an unsatisfactory 550
approach to measuring interest rate risk. There is a need for banks and their supervisors
to reduce the gap statement into a single scalar: the rupee impact of a given shock to the
yield curve.
This paper was based on complex imputation procedures which proceed from public domain
disclosure of the ‘liquidity statement’ in the annual reports of banks, to an estimate of 555
future cashﬂows of the bank. There is a case for improving rules governing disclosure, so
that the ‘interest rate risk statement’ and estimates of future cashﬂows are also revealed
by banks.
One striking feature of these results is the heterogeneity seen across banks. Banks holding
similar portfolios of government securities seem to often have rather diﬀerent exposures. 560
This suggests that RBI’s ‘investment ﬂuctuation reserve’, which is computed as a fraction
of holdings of the investment portfolio, without regard for the extent to which risk is hedged
away, is an unsatisfactory approach to addressing interest rate risk.
Our results highlight the consequences of stretching out the yield curve for banking system
fragility. While stretching out the yield curve is a sound strategy for public debt manage- 565
ment, it can generate vulnerabilities in the banking system. If there is a perception that
the banking system is vulnerable in the event of an increase in interest rates, it could have
deleterious consequences by constraining the conduct of monetary policy at RBI.
Finally, the techniques used in this paper can be eﬀective in throwing up names of banks
in the top quartile by the vulnerability to interest-rate ﬂuctuations. Our results suggest 570
that banks such as Vijaya Bank appear to be much more vulnerable to interest rate risk
27than banks such as HDFC Bank. These techniques could be used by banking supervisors
in identifying the most vulnerable banks and putting a special focus on their risks.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we hope to have obtained persuasive answers to some important questions 575
on the interest rate risk exposure of banks in India.
• What are the interest-rate scenarios which should be the focus of banks and their supervisors,
in assessing interest-rate risk?
We ﬁnd that the bis notion of a 99% percentile movement on a one–year holding period
implies envisioning and analysing the consequences of a shock of 320 bps. 580
• What is the impact upon equity capital of parallel shifts to the yield curve of this magnitude,
for important banks in the Indian banking system?
We ﬁnd that for 33 of the 42 banks in our sample, over 25% of equity capital would be
gained or lost in the event of a 320 bps move in the yield curve.
• Are banks in India homogeneous in their interest-rate risk exposure, or is there strong 585
cross-sectional heterogeneity?
Both the accounting data and the stock market sensitivities suggest that there is strong
heterogeneity across banks in India in their interest rate exposure.
• Do speculators on the stock market impound information about the interest-rate exposure
of a bank in forming stock prices? Can we corroborate measures of interest rate risk from 590
the stock returns process with those obtained from accounting data
We ﬁnd that for many banks, the stock market returns process does exhibit strong interest
rate sensitivity; i.e. we can reject the null hypothesis that the stock market is unaware
of interest rate risk when valuing bank stocks. At the same time, we ﬁnd that there
are only weak links between estimates of interest rate exposure obtained through the two 595
methodologies.
• What are useful diagnostic procedures through which banks and their supervisors can mea-
sure interest-rate exposure?
Our work suggests that banks and their supervisors may beneﬁt from computing interest
rate exposure through these two approaches. The board of directors of a bank could use 600
such estimates as an outside check upon risk management procedures. Supervisors could
use such tools to isolate the most vulnerable banks in the system, and better allocate scarce
supervisory capacity.
28A Estimating the maturity pattern of future cash-
ﬂows 605
Banks are required to disclose a statement on the maturity pattern of their assets and liabilities
classiﬁed in diﬀerent time buckets. We use this data, along with data on the composition of their
assets and liabilities, to arrive at an assessment of future cash ﬂows in diﬀerent time buckets.
As a general principle, the accounting procedures of banks associate the face value on a stated
asset or liability on the terminal (maturity) date T. We need to go beyond this, to enumerate the 610
complete list of cashﬂows. Hence, for each class of assets reported by banks, we impute a certain
‘coupon rate’, using which cashﬂows are imputed for the time intervals between date 0 and date
T.
The time bands used in the ‘statement of structural liquidity’ are 1-14 days, 15 to 28 days, 29
days to 3 months, 6 months to 1 year, 1 to 3 years, 3 to 5 years and greater than 5 years. We 615
impute a statement of cash ﬂows that corresponds to the time bands in the ‘statement of interest
rate sensitivity’ as speciﬁed by rbi. This imputation proceeds in the following steps:
A.1 Assets
On the asset side, Loans and Advances can be broken up into two parts: (a) bills and (b) demand
loans and term loans. We observe the maturity structure of loans and advances, however we do 620
not separately observe the maturity structure of bills, demand loans and term loans. We assume
that the maturity structure of each of these is identical to the maturity structure of Loans and
Advances.
In the case of demand loans and term loans, we assume these are entirely ﬂoating rate loans,
linked to the Prime Lending Rate. We assume that plr revisions can take place in 3 months. 625
Hence, demand loans and term loans upto 3 months are classiﬁed according to their maturity.
The remainder are placed into the 3–6 month bucket. The cash ﬂows generated from the interest
earned at the plr rate is distributed in the 0 to 1 month bucket and the 1 to 3 month bucket,
while the 3 to 6 month bucket has both the interest earned and the principal.
In the case of bills, short-dated bills are directly classiﬁed. Beyond the 3–6 month bucket, we 630
assume that 90% of the bills are ﬂoating rate products (which are classiﬁed into 3–6 months)
while the remainder are placed in the relevant bucket.
For Investments, both government and corporate bonds are assumed to be ﬁxed rate and are
classiﬁed as per the liquidity statement.
For Cash and balances with the rbi, we consider cash to be non-sensitive. Balances with the rbi 635
upto 3 percentage points of crr is also assumed to be zero maturity as no interest is paid on
them. The crr balance in excess of 3 percentage points, which earns interest, is classiﬁed into
the 3–6 month bucket.
29A.2 Liabilities
The liquidity statement shows a single maturity pattern of deposits. We need to unbundle time 640
deposits as opposed to savings deposits and current deposits from this statement.
rbi’s Asset-Liability Management (alm) Guidelines suggest that in the liquidity statement, cur-
rent and savings deposits are divided into their core and volatile portions through the following
mechanism. A “volatile portion” (15% of current accounts and 10% of savings accounts) may be
classiﬁed in the liquidity table in the 1-14 days bucket. The remainder is be classiﬁed in the 1-3 645
year bucket of the liquidity statement.
RBI regulations suggest that banks are free to use alternative modeling frameworks in arriving
at estimates of core versus volatile demand deposits. We estimate the maturity pattern of time
deposits while assuming that all banks are using RBI guidelines. In this fashion, we subtract
current and savings deposits from the maturity pattern of total deposits as shown in the liquidity 650
statement.12
In the case of both current accounts and savings accounts, we have an imputation scheme where
some fraction is placed into a near bucket and the remainder is placed into a far bucket. The
fractions are varied in producing multiple sets of assumptions (see Table 8).
The maturity pattern of time deposits directly goes into imputed future cashﬂows on the liabilities 655
side.
Equity capital and reserves are placed in the zero-maturity time bucket.
A.3 Assumptions used in this imputation
The assumptions which are made in this process, for the accounting year 2001-02, are summarised
as follows: 660
• The interest-rate on savings bank deposits: 3.54%.
• The interest rate on time deposits: 7%.
• The interest rate on the liabilities side for borrowings by the bank: 6.58%.
12Let C represent current accounts and S represent savings accounts. rbi’s alm guidelines suggest that
0.15C +0.1S is added to time deposits (if any) in the 1-14 days bucket, and 0.85C +0.9S is added to time
deposits (if any) in the 1-3 year bucket.
In our dataset, we ﬁnd 6 banks where this imputation procedure yields a negative value for time deposits
in the 1-3 year bucket. These are : Karur Vysya Bank, State Bank of Patiala, State Bank of Mysore,
Allahabad Bank, Uco Bank and Bank of Rajasthan. In addition, for Central Bank of India we obtain a
negative value for the time deposits in the 1-14 days bucket. This would suggest that these seven entities
use other models for estimation of core versus volatile demand deposits.
Once the entire imputation process is complete (and all assets and liabilities have been mapped into
cashﬂows), we ﬁnd only one case (Central Bank of India) where a value in the cashﬂow vector is negative.
Hence, Central Bank of India was dropped from our dataset.
30• The interest rate earned on bills purchased by the bank: 10%.
• The plr of the year: 11%. 665
• The level of crr: 5.5%.
• The interest rate that rbi paid beyond three percent points on crr: 6.5%.
• The average interest rate for imputing intermediate cashﬂows on all investments: 5.58%.
• The time bucket to place plr-linked investments: 6 months to 1 year.
• The fraction of bills (in higher buckets) which are actually plr linked: 90%. 670
• Duration of assets and liabilities classiﬁed as “greater than ﬁve years” : 10 years. The rationale for
this is as follows. The bulk of bank assets with maturity over 5 years are government bonds. GOI
bonds beyond 5 years stretch out to 20 years. Hence 10 years appears to be a plausible average
point.
As a general principle, our focus is on the measurement of interest rate sensitivity. Hence, certain 675
elements (on either assets or liabilities) which are insensitive to ﬂuctuations in interest rates, do
not feature in our vector of cashﬂows. This implies that the NPV of cashﬂows, which we call A
or L, would not be correct. However, data elements which feature in the impact upon NPV of
changes in interest rates are captured by us.







B What is the size of the interest-rate shock envi- 680
sioned?
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) suggests that the central issue in interest-
rate risk is parallel shifts of the yield curve; it suggests that the economic signiﬁcance of parallel
shifts substantially exceeds the signiﬁcance of localised movements in certain parts of the yield
curve. 685
bis suggests that a parallel shift of 200 basis points should be simulated in the absence of data
analysis. Alternatively, it suggests that ﬁve years of daily data should be utilised in measuring
the change in the long rate over 240-day holding periods, and the 1th percentile and the 99th
percentile should be read oﬀ for the purpose of simulations.
B.1 Data in India for the long rate 690
We use the nse yield curve dataset, and evaluate the interest rate at t = 10 every day, thus giving
us a daily time-series of the ten-year rate.
The bis suggests that the one-year move in the long rate should be approximated by changes in
the long rate over 240 days. We ﬁnd that there are (on average) 288 trading days per year in
India. Hence, we focus on the change in the long rate over 288 trading days. 695
B.2 Empirical results
Table 6 shows summary statistics of the 288-day change in the 10-year rate. We see that over this
period, i.e. from 1/1/1997 to 31/7/2002, the typical year has experienced a drop in the 10-year
rate. Figure 5 shows a kernel density estimator of the 288-day change in the 10-year rate.
The bis procedure recommends simulating parallel shifts of the yield curve using the 1% and the 700
99% points oﬀ the distribution of the 288-day rate. We see that these values are -320 basis points
and +112 basis points respectively.
Looking forward, there is no reason to expect asymmetry in movements of the yield curve. Hence,
in this paper, we will undertake two simulations of parallel shifts of the yield curve: of 200 basis
points and 320 basis points. 705
32Figure 5 Kernel density estimator of the 288-day change in the 10-year rate
-2 0 2




C Calculating ARMA residuals for rM, rL and rd
As discussed in Section 2.2, we need to extract innovations in the returns time-series for the
explanatory variables of the augmented market model. Table 7 shows AR(10) estimates for the
three daily series, at both daily and weekly frequencies. Our speciﬁcation search suggested that
an AR model with ten lags was a parsimonious speciﬁcation which captured a signiﬁcant part of 710
the correlation, and served to sharply reduce (though not entirely eliminate) the extent to serial
correlation in the series.
These tables show remarkably sharp rejections of the null of non-predictability of returns on
the bond market. There is a striking contrast between Nifty and the two bond returns time-
series, where Nifty is much closer to the eﬃcient–markets ideal of zero serial correlations. This 715
is particularly the case with returns on the short bond, which exhibits extremely strong serial
correlations, by the standards of ﬁnancial market returns.
33Table 7 AR(10) estimates for the three series
This table shows AR(10) estimates for rM, rL and rf series, at both daily and weekly frequencies. Coeﬃ-
cients which are signiﬁcant at a 95% level of signiﬁcance are shown in boldface.
The estimates at a daily frequency show strong correlation structure, i.e. violations of market eﬃciency,
for the bond returns. For example, the ﬁrst lag has a value of just 0.038 for Nifty, but has large values of
-0.3378 for the long bond and -0.4464 for the short bond. The Q statistic for daily returns on the short
and long bond proves to be 250 and 294, both of which are extremely large values.
At a weekly frequency, returns on the short bond has strong serial correlations, but returns on the long
bond does not.
At the bottom of the table, the Box-Ljung Q statistic is shown for the raw returns, and for the residuals
obtained from the AR(10) model. In all cases, we see that the H0 : Q = 0 is not rejected for the residuals
at a 95% level of signiﬁcance. These residuals are utilised in estimation of the augmented market model.
Daily Weekly
rM rL rf rM rL rf
Intercept 0.0239 0.0340 0.0003 0.0171 0.1894 0.0012
(0.046) (1.548) (0.784) (0.075) (1.68) (1.079)
Lag 1 0.0381 -0.3378 -0.4464 0.0990 -0.0215 -0.4864
(2.086) (-36.2) (-31.3) (2.056) (-0.71) (-13.4)
Lag 2 -0.0226 -0.1600 -0.1852 -0.0611 -0.0619 -0.3516
(-1.19) (-9.83) (-10.3) (-0.98) (-0.71) (-6.63)
Lag 3 0.0134 -0.0133 -0.0980 -0.0023 -0.1726 -0.1884
(0.560) (-0.57) (-5.63) (-0.04) (-3.98) (-2.68)
Lag 4 0.0122 0.0179 -0.1391 -0.0719 -0.0210 -0.2101
(0.496) (0.881) (-9.22) (-1.31) (-0.25) (-2.82)
Lag 5 0.0554 0.0247 -0.0726 -0.0191 -0.0284 -0.1682
(2.916) (1.146) (-4.85) (-0.32) (-0.24) (-2.71)
Lag 6 -0.0649 0.0773 0.0046 -0.0258 -0.0444 -0.1359
(-2.93) (7.310) (0.239) (-0.38) (-0.49) (-1.95)
Lag 7 -0.0143 -0.0006 -0.0596 -0.0095 -0.0129 -0.0988
(-0.90) (-0.04) (-3.20) (-0.15) (-0.12) (-1.68)
Lag 8 -0.0084 -0.0090 -0.1314 0.0662 0.0642 -0.2691
(-0.37) (-0.34) (-7.77) (1.038) (-0.78) (-4.46)
Lag 9 0.0548 0.0208 -0.0600 0.0681 -0.0175 -0.1515
(2.332) (0.897) (-3.55) (1.067) (-0.23) (-2.31)
Lag 10 0.0430 0.0857 -0.0286 0.03662 0.0250 -0.1103
(1.840) (4.809) (-1.71) (0.696) (0.291) (-2.04)
T 1626 1608 1608 351 290 290
logL -3229.12 -2279.22 3550.56 -959.14 -615.47 479.62
Q statistic
Returns 58.3414 250.3557 293.7092 41.26 31.953 86.66
Prob value 0.0305 0.0000 0.0000 0.415 0.814 0.000
Residuals 34.5350 51.3533 55.6464 25.46 19.782 43.33
Prob value 0.7142 0.1077 0.0510 0.964 0.997 0.331
34Table 8 Four sets of assumptions for behaviour of current and savings deposits
Behavioural assumptions about savings accounts and current accounts have a signiﬁcant impact upon the
results. Hence, in addition to the rules speciﬁed by rbi for the interest rate risk statement, we can have
three assumptions, labelled Pessimistic, Baseline and Optimistic. This gives us a total of four assumptions.
Parameter Optimistic Baseline Pessimistic RBI
Savings accounts
Short fraction 0% 15% 30% 25%
Short maturity 0 0 0 0
Long fraction 100% 85% 70% 75%
Long maturity 1-3 years 1-3 years 1-3 years 3-6 months
Current accounts
Short fraction 10% 25% 50% 100%
Short maturity 0 0 0 0
Long fraction 90% 75% 50% 0%
Long maturity 1-3 years 1-3 years 1-3 years
D Alternative assumptions about treatment of de-
mand deposits
As emphasised in Section 2.1.1, a major factor which aﬀects estimates of interest rate risk of banks 720
is the extent to which demand deposits can be viewed as being ‘stable’. While our main focus
has been on one ‘baseline’ set of assumptions, we also explore the sensitivity to four alternative
sets of assumptions.
First, we have a set of assumptions titled RBI, which uses rbi’s requirements for the interest rate
risk statement. It involves assuming that 75% of savings deposits are “stable”, and that these have 725
an eﬀective maturity of 3-6 months. This appears to be an unusually short time horizon, given
(a) the strong stability of savings accounts and (b) the long time till modiﬁcation of the savings
bank interest rate in India. rbi’s requirements suggest that 100% of current accounts should be
considered volatile. This appears to be an unusually strong requirement, when compared with
the empirical experience of banks in India. 730
We report calculations for sbi using the RBI assumptions, since it is the regulatory requirement.
In addition, we have Baseline assumptions, where 15% of savings accounts are assumed to be
volatile, and the remainder have a maturity of 1-3 years. We assume that 25% of current accounts
are volatile, and the remainder have a maturity of 1-3 years. We perturb these assumptions to
produce two additional sets of assumptions: Optimistic (from the viewpoint of a bank seeking to 735
hold long dated assets) and Pessimistic. This gives us four sets of assumptions in all, which are
summarised in Table 8.
Table 9 shows banks with the highest and lowest ﬁve values, seen in our dataset, for the fraction of
demand deposits in total deposits. This is relevant when interpreting our four sets of assumptions
for the treatment of demand deposits. For banks such as IDBI Bank, where as much as 46% of 740
deposits were demand deposits, alternative assumptions about stability of demand deposits would
35Table 9 Variation in fraction of demand deposits
The fraction of demand deposits in total deposits is important insofar as it expresses the extent to which
alternative behavioural assumptions about core versus volatile demand deposits could aﬀect the results.




I D B I Bank Ltd. 46.22
Punjab National Bank 44.32
State Bank Of Bikaner and Jaipur 43.43
Bank Of Rajasthan Ltd. 42.91
Allahabad Bank 42.23
State Bank Of India 36.48
U T I Bank Ltd. 16.50
I C I C I Bank Ltd. 16.31
Indusind Bank Ltd. 12.96
Lord Krishna Bank Ltd. 12.14
matter more.
36Table 10 Accounting information : Example (sbi)
The maturity pattern of assets and liabilities is derived from the ’liquidity statement’ which is disclosed in
the annual report of banks. In addition, we also require many auxiliary elements of information derived
from the annual report, which are used in the algorithm for estimating the maturity pattern of cashﬂows.
We see that the equity capital of SBI, which is the sum of paid up capital and reserves, was Rs.15,224
crore.
Liquidity statement (Rs. crore)
1-14d 15-28d 29d-3m 3m-6m 6m-12m 1-3y 3-5y >5y Sum
Advances 21425.0 9935.0 10967.0 1293.0 2274.0 27898.0 9766.0 15407.0 98965.0
Investments 7635.0 879.0 4494.0 7151.0 5361.0 30085.0 22269.0 62599.0 140473.0
Deposits 17414.0 1593.0 3105.0 4532.0 9407.0 159207.0 46804.0 7253.0 249315.0
Borrowings 0.1 0.9 26.1 33.2 338.9 732.8 907.2 114.7 2153.9
Other information from annual report (Rs. crore)
Parameter Value
Schedule 9 Bills 11555.36
Schedule 9 Demand loans 64178.41
Schedule 9 Term loans 45072.70
Cash in hand 1052.58
Balance with rbi 20819.95
Savings deposits 56396.36
Demand Deposits 42312.79
Paid up Capital 526.30
Reserves 14698.08
E An example: SBI
In this section, we show detailed results of applying the two methods to the largest bank of the
system, SBI. 745
1. Table 10 shows the maturity statement, and auxiliary annual report information, about sbi.
2. Table 11 applies the methods of Appendix A to this information. It gives us vectors of cashﬂows
for assets and liabilities.
3. Table 12 shows the NPV impact of simulated interest rate shocks under baseline assumptions. This
calculation suggests that on 31 March 2002, sbi would lose 11.2% of equity capital in the event of 750
a 320 bps parallel shift of the yield curve.
To the extent that SBI has unrealised gains on GOI bonds, and the balance sheet does not reﬂect
full marking to market, our estimate of the equity capital of SBI is an underestimate. Our estimate,
that sbi could lose roughly Rs.1,704 crore in the event of a 320 bps parallel shift of the yield curve,
is unaﬀected. However, when we express this as a fraction of equity capital, we are overstating SBI’s 755
exposure.
37Table 11 Imputed maturity pattern of cashﬂows : Example (sbi)
(Rs. crore)
Liabilities
Bucket Assets Optimistic Baseline Pessimistic RBI
Zero 12409 19456 34262 53300 71636
0-1mth 41659 8078 8053 8028 8037
1-3mth 18382 5163 5113 5063 5079
3-6mth 21927 7558 7483 7408 49730
6-12mth 87411 15571 15421 15272 14573
1-3yrs 43282 189635 174229 154593 91164
3-5yrs 31882 55414 55414 55414 55414
> 5yrs 80285 9944 9944 9944 9944
Table 12 Measurement of impact of interest-rate shocks: Example (sbi)
This table shows an example, for State Bank of India in 2001-02, of simulating hypothetical parallel shifts
to the yield curve as of 31 March 2002.
The ﬁrst line shows the impact of a 200 basis point shift in the yield curve. This would have an impact
of Rs.11,126 crore on assets, Rs.9,833 crore on liabilities, and hence Rs.1,294 crore on equity capital. The
drop of Rs.1,294 crore proves to be 8.50% of equity capital, and 0.37% of total assets. Similar calculations
are shown for a shock of 320 basis points also.





200 -11,126 -9,833 -1,294 -8.50 -0.37
320 -17,079 -15,375 -1,704 -11.19 -0.49
Table 13 Impact upon equity capital under four sets of assumptions: Example (sbi)
This table is an example, of measuring the impact of interest rate shocks upon equity capital and upon
assets, of the four sets of assumptions about demand deposits, for one bank (sbi). Our deﬁnitions of
Pessimistic, Baseline and Optimistic correspond to an impact upon equity capital of 17.83%, 11.19% and
5.98% respectively, for a 320 bps shock. The RBI assumptions implies an impact of 36.28% of equity
capital.
Optimistic Baseline Pessimistic RBI
∆ ∆E/E ∆E/A ∆E/E ∆E/A ∆E/E ∆E/A ∆E/E ∆E/A
0.0200 -5.19 -0.23 -8.50 -0.37 -12.71 -0.56 -24.45 -1.07
0.0320 -5.98 -0.26 -11.19 -0.49 -17.83 -0.78 -36.28 -1.58
38Table 14 Augmented market model estimation : Example (sbi)
As explained in Section 2.2, we estimate the augmented model:
(rj − rf) = α + β1(rM − rf) + β2(rL − rf) + 
One example of these estimates, for sbi, is shown here. We report four variants: using daily versus weekly
data, and using raw returns versus arma residuals. In all cases, we ﬁnd that H0 : α = 0 is not rejected.
As with stock betas, β2 is interpreted as an elasticity. For example, in the results for raw weekly returns, it
appears that in a week where the long bond (rL−rf) lost 1%, SBI shares dropped by 0.8359% on average.
Daily Weekly
Raw Residuals Raw Residuals
α 0.0665 0.0701 0.108 0.2662
(0.70) (0.74) (0.218) (0.527)
β1 0.8928 0.8929 0.8369 0.8204
(16.32) (16.16) (6.402) (6.038)
β2 0.2807 0.3330 0.8359 0.5872
(2.019) (2.344) (2.316) (1.656)
R2 0.3744 0.3698 0.3732 0.3270
T 473 473 104 104
4. Table 13 shows the results for sensitivity analysis through four sets of assumptions. Our deﬁnitions
of Pessimistic, Baseline and Optimistic correspond to an impact upon equity capital of 17.83%, 11.19%
and 5.98% respectively, for a 320 bps shock. The RBI assumptions imply an impact of 36.28% of
equity capital. 760
5. Table 14 shows estimation results for the augmented market model. As a ﬁrst approximation, the
coeﬃcient of 0.8359 may be interpreted as follows. A 100 bps parallel shift in the yield curve would
give a roughly 10% impact on rL. This would hit the equity of sbi by roughly 8.3%.
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